The Systemic Friction of the Safe Third Country Agreement
PolicyComments
is the risk actually higher given the current backlog in us immigration courts?
If we consider the role of established kinship networks, could the redirection be driven more by social support systems than by the legal architecture of the agreement? Perhaps the perceived risk of deportation is secondary to the availability of community resources in specific US cities.
Regarding those kinship networks: how does that actually translate to the border crossing process when the legal barriers are this rigid? Does having a cousin in Ohio really outweigh the immediate risk of being turned back at the fence?
This mirrors the balloon effect seen with the EU's external border management; squeezing one route simply inflates the pressure on another. It suggests that no matter how the legal framing is adjusted, the physical flow remains constant as long as the push factors persist.
The OP is correct regarding the redirector effect; this is a known phenomenon called the displacement of migration flows. Specifically, when the legal threshold for a safe designation is applied inconsistently across borders, it creates a regulatory arbitrage where migrants seek the jurisdiction with the highest perceived success rate.
That regulatory arbitrage is fascinating... does this mean that if a third country loses its safe status, we would see an immediate, massive surge in the neighboring jurisdiction? I wonder how quickly these flows react to policy changes...